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Reframing Faculty Pro Bono
Ezra Ross
Soon after receiving accreditation, one regional law school considered
whether to adopt a mandatory pro bono policy.1 All members of the committee
charged with studying the proposal supported it.2 But the committee also
knew that not all faculty members would approve it.3 The committee members
therefore avoided any suggestion that faculty, as opposed to just students,
would need to do pro bono.4 They feared that imposing the requirement on
faculty would derail the entire proposal.5
At another law school, the faculty took a different tack. Segregating
proposals, the faculty first approved a pro bono requirement for students.6 Only
“seconds later,” the faculty rejected a pro bono requirement for professors.7
And one top five law school, in describing its program to the ABA, affirmed
its “dedicat[ion] to the principle that members of the legal profession and
those aspiring to enter the legal profession have a professional obligation to
assist in providing quality legal services to individuals, groups or causes that
are under-represented in the legal system.”8 In the same submission, however,
it provided no response to a question about “Faculty and Administrative Pro
Bono,” leaving only a blank space.9
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A disconnect exists in law schools’ treatment of pro bono. Law schools
encourage or require students to do it. And they celebrate students’ pro
bono accomplishments. But this dedication to student pro bono masks an
underlying ambivalence. Some of the same faculties that broadcast the pro
bono credentials of students shrink from doing pro bono work themselves, a
situation described by a leading commentator as “shameful.”10
The larger debate about pro bono manifests a similar gap. The literature
of pro bono reform, for example, addresses primarily full-time practitioners.11
And although a cluster of papers years ago asserted a moral obligation for law
professors to perform pro bono and proposed formal pro bono requirements
for legal academics,12 that conversation has since largely withered.13 Nor
does evidence exist that the limited exhortations in the literature have even
minimally boosted faculty pro bono participation rates.14
This essay aims to resuscitate and reframe the discussion of faculty pro
bono. Doing so has implications beyond mere academic gap-filling. Nearly a
million indigent Americans seek legal assistance each year but receive none,
solely for lack of resources.15 Improving faculty pro bono participation can
help address this breakdown in the operation of our justice system. It would
simultaneously bolster law professors’ real-world legal experience, helping
answer the perennial criticism that legal academics are out of touch with the
realities of practice.16
Why then, considering these benefits, have past efforts to launch a robust
conversation about faculty pro bono not flourished? What explains, for
example, why calls for a faculty pro bono mandate have flopped? Forging a
new frame compels grappling with the challenges that have stifled previous
approaches.
To that end, the literature of behavioral economics offers a powerful
explanatory framework. Choice-reducing public policy “shoves,” like
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proposed faculty pro bono mandates, can trigger intense resistance.17 And
applying proposed shoves to fiercely independent groups like law professors18
can amplify pushback.
A “nudge”-based regime, rooted in the scholarship of choice architecture,19
would better acknowledge unique characteristics of law professors. Low-cost,
minimally intrusive strategies like mandated choice and priming20 could help
cajole, rather than shove, faculty toward greater pro bono participation. And to
address the reality of cognitive inertia21—many law professors have gone years
without practicing—law schools could curate listings of “compact” potential
pro bono projects keyed to faculty interests. Put more generally, proposed
solutions should meet faculty where they are, not where commentators might
want them to be.
A reframed approach to faculty pro bono would also put moral reasoning
in the back seat. A nascent strain of ethical philosophy suggests that morally
loaded messaging can sometimes undermine, rather than promote, the
behavior sought to be encouraged.22 Underscoring the putative immorality
of faculty failure to do pro bono may, for example, entrench faculty resistance
and trigger “moral backfire.”23 As an alternative, I propose emphasizing
more affirmative messaging tethered to faculty commitments and values. For
example, highlighting benefits to scholarship and teaching from pro bono,
rather than framing pro bono as a condition to professional privilege, could
help reduce the risk that advocacy efforts boomerang.
Finally, this essay eschews one-size-fits-all approaches and advocates more
bespoke methods that recognize the different identities in play. Merely arguing
that faculty should do pro bono for the same reasons that practitioners should
do it disregards that faculty view their professional identities as significantly
different from those of practitioners. Nor is the category of law faculty itself
a monolith.24 The conversations needed to spark pro bono participation
by members of the lawyering skills community, for example, may differ
17
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significantly from the discussions that will work to do the same for consumer
law faculty or scholars researching social justice issues. I therefore advocate
tailored, rather than blanket, strategies to promote faculty pro bono.
This essay proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the
literature on pro bono reform generally. Crossing scholarly boundaries,
part I also integrates critical work raising concerns about lack of practical
experience in the modern law professoriate. Part II introduces the proposed
reframing of faculty pro bono issues. It diagnoses potential problems with
past approaches and canvasses alternative strategies inspired by behavioral
economics, the psychology of choice, and scholarly work on ethical reasoning
and communities of practice.
Part III tackles objections. For example, does this proposed reframing do
enough to counter pressure by law schools to publish, not practice? Does
it collapse in the face of many law professors’ identification as scholars, not
public interest practitioners? In any event, might abandoning proposed pro
bono mandates just cement the status quo? And could soft-pedaling law
professors’ moral obligation compromise the most forceful argument for
faculty pro bono?
After evaluating these concerns, this essay concludes in part IV with a
concession and a plea. Faculty pro bono is a hard problem. No essay will solve
it. A new frame, however, might make space for experimentation and a new
phase of the conversation.
I. Background
Issues of faculty pro bono arise at the intersection of several broader debates:
the literature of attorney pro bono generally, and scholarship discussing the
identity and experience of law faculty.
General Pro Bono Scholarship
The justice gap casts a long shadow over the American legal system: Nearly
a million poor people who sought legal help in a recent year received no or
inadequate assistance for lack of adequate resources.25 To address the problem,
commentators have advocated a raft of potential solutions, including required
practitioner pro bono.26 Proponents of a mandate argue that lawyers benefit
from a state-created monopoly on legal services.27 Therefore, attorneys owe a
moral obligation to help promote equal access to legal services through pro
bono work.28 Critics challenge mandatory pro bono proposals on variety of
25
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grounds. For example, lawyers are not responsible for solving problems of
poverty,29 according to some observers, and “conscripts make poor lawyers.”30
Some authors, however, acknowledge that not all practitioners are similarly
situated with respect to pro bono. For example, some commentators have
discussed how pro bono participation by certain types of attorneys can raise
concerns, like the potentially damaging role of positional conflicts for largefirm lawyers.31 Other scholars have debated whether all lawyers, both largefirm attorneys and solo practitioners alike, should be subject to the same pro
bono expectations.32
Law Professors’ Experience and Scholarship
A distinct literature explores the practical experience of law faculty.
According to critics, law faculty consistently fail to prepare students
for practice.33 Some commentators have also assailed legal academics for
producing scholarship that has little bearing on actual attorneys.34
One thread of scholarship has linked these concerns to legal academics’ lack
of substantial practice experience.35 According to this work, even professors
with significant past practice experience can rapidly become out of touch
with the quickly changing realities of practice.36 This has led to some debate
whether professors should need to meet a continued practice requirement.37
The arguments in this vein of scholarship, however, generally do not focus on
pro bono work.38
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Limited Literature Addressing Law Professor Pro Bono
The scholarship on pro bono reform and the literature on law professors’
practice experience conceptually overlap at the issue of law professors’ pro
bono practice. Yet few commentators have analyzed law professor pro bono in
detail. Nor have the handful of papers written on the topic more than a decade
ago generated a robust, ongoing conversation.39
The articles that have closely examined faculty pro bono have tended to
showcase professors’ “moral responsibility” or “duty.”40 The argument that
faculty have a duty to do pro bono rests on the premise that law faculty
benefit from attorneys’ monopoly on delivering legal services the same way
that practitioners do.41 For example, law professors’ salaries outstrip those
in comparable departments because they are pegged to salaries in the legal
market.42 Thus, although many law faculty view themselves as scholars, rather
than lawyers, law professors reap the rewards associated with private practice.43
Accordingly, they have the same obligations as practitioners to improve access
to justice.44 In making these arguments, one leading commentator described
law professors’ failure to do pro bono when they require students to do so as
a form of “hypocrisy.”45
Scholars have also contended that faculty have as an empirical matter failed
to meet this pro bono obligation.46 One essay, for example, describes law
professors’ pro bono participation levels as “shameful.”47 Comprehensive data
on faculty pro bono hours, however, does not exist because most law schools
do not even attempt to track faculty pro bono.48
On those grounds, some commentators have advocated mandatory pro
bono by law professors.49 These proposals have relied on the duty-based
Professing Pro Bono: To Walk the Walk, 15 Notre Dame J. L. Eth. & Pub. Pol’y 5, 30–31 (2001)
(discussing faculty disdain for practice and the role of pro bono work).
39
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reasoning described above, as well as benefits from faculty pro bono such
as modeling for students and improved classroom teaching.50 Some authors
have argued for at least fifty hours of faculty pro bono per year.51 Others have
contended that a pro bono mandate should replace continuing legal education
requirements for law professors.52
The core cluster of articles closely examining faculty pro bono, written
by David Luban, Deborah Rhode, and Erwin Chemerinsky, was published
in 1999 and 2004.53 In the intervening years, few scholars have continued
the conversation about faculty pro bono.54 Those who have written more
recently on this issue have largely repeated calls for a mandate.55 Nor does
evidence suggest faculty have intensified their pro bono participation since
the publication of articles about law professor pro bono.56 Indeed, even law
schools’ own pro bono coordinators have said many faculty do not act as good
pro bono role models for their students.57
II. Reframing
With the conversation about faculty pro bono at this point largely stalled,
little evidence of increases in faculty pro bono participation, and continually
growing need for pro bono legal services, this essay proposes a reframing.
This part begins with relinquishment of calls for a faculty pro bono
mandate. Building on work from behavioral economics, I advocate a nudgebased approach to promote faculty pro bono. Second, I argue for a deemphasis
of the narrative of moral obligation and a refocusing on more affirmative
messaging. Third, I contend that forms of persuasion more tailored to specific
professional identities of different groups of law professors could outperform
a one-size-fits-all approach to framing the stakes of faculty pro bono.
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A. From Mandate to Nudges

Problems with Mandates
Proposed faculty pro bono mandates have gone nowhere.58 Even their
advocates have acknowledged that the prospects for a mandate are “dim” and
that believing otherwise is “naïve.”59 Part of the explanation: “No one likes to
be regulated, and law professors in particular are fiercely independent.”60
But commentators favoring a mandate have nevertheless argued that
advocating a mandate could “induce debate and force examination” of the
faculty pro bono issue.61 Even debate, however, has for the most part not
occurred.62
Moreover, even could a mandate succeed, it would impose a host of
costs. For example, mandates—or “shoves,” as some authors describe them—
can inflict harms caused by grafting one-size-fits-all solutions on differing
individual circumstances.63 They can also cause welfare losses resulting
from deprivation of the right to choose.64 Mandates requiring charitable
action might also undermine the goal they seek to achieve: “By diminishing
participants’ sense that they are acting for altruistic reasons,” mandates “could
erode commitment and discourage some individuals from contributing above
the prescribed minimum.”65
The Nudging Alternative
In San Marcos, California, nearly 300 families participated in a study of
energy usage.66 Researchers informed the families of their energy usage and
provided a comparison to average consumption.67 Thereafter, above-average
energy users significantly decreased their energy usage.68 When big energy
58
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users also received an unhappy emoticon with their disclosures, they reduced
their energy usage even more.69
A nudge, like those energy disclosures, “is any aspect of [] choice architecture
that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any
options or significantly changing their economic incentives.”70 Nudges can
gently move people to do things that improve people’s lives, without sacrificing
the freedom to choose.71 Nudges exist for situations, like the state of faculty
pro bono, in which mandates are either undesirable or unavailable.72
A range of possible tweaks to the choice architecture of faculty pro bono
exists. For example, a low-impact nudge could utilize priming. Priming rests
on the finding that when researchers ask subjects what the subjects plan to do,
the mere asking of the question influences what the subjects end up doing.73
For example, asking people the day before an election whether they intend to
vote can increase the probability of their voting by up to 25%.74
Here, law school administrators could prime faculty members by simply
asking them whether they plan to do pro bono work each year. This could
come in the form of a simple email to the faculty. And administrators could
magnify the impact by asking faculty what sort of pro bono they plan to do.
Research indicates that eliciting such details can potentially intensify the
priming effect.75
A slightly more aggressive nudge could deploy mandated choice. Mandated
choice involves not merely presenting a question but requiring an answer to
move forward in a process.76 For example, the state of Illinois required driver’s
license applicants to check a box consenting to or declining organ donation,
and recorded “encouraging results.”77 Here, a question to faculty about their
pro bono plans could form part of a mandatory survey, rather than a simple
email. Requiring faculty to answer the question, in addition to raising the issue
through an email, could amplify the priming impact of the question.
Even more forcefully, law schools could request pro bono hours data from
professors and then report the information to the faculty.78 Specifically, schools
69
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could disclose to the entire faculty average hours contributed by reporting
faculty members and could report to each individual professor whether that
person is doing less pro bono than average. Such a social nudge, like the
energy usage scenario above, could encourage faculty members to try to at
least match peer contributions.79
Ultimately, which combination of nudges would have the greatest impact
cannot be resolved without some school-to-school experimentation and
assessment. Nevertheless, one default approach could be for a law school
to begin with the lowest-cost, least aggressive nudges, e.g., simple priming
or mandated choice, and then ratchet up to more forceful nudges, such as
reporting and public disclosure of faculty pro bono hours, as needed.
Making Choice and Performance Easier
In addition to nudging faculty toward pro bono, administrators can also
take the closely related action of removing obstacles to choosing pro bono
projects. Providing curated lists of pro bono projects could potentially help:
As studies show, presenting limited options can help spur action in some
circumstances.80 Of course law school personnel who prepare those lists, such
as pro bono coordinators, would need some criteria to whittle down options.
Most easily, listings could feature projects from organizations that have
previously provided reliable or popular opportunities. Or the coordinator and
pro bono staff, resources permitting, could tailor listings of projects to faculty
research interests. For example, schools could offer projects raising consumer
or immigration law issues to professors who write in those areas.81

Of course, this would constitute a mandate, not a nudge. That alone does not disqualify
required reporting as a potential approach. In fact, mandatory reporting might provide
a variety of benefits. But, for some of the same reasons that faculty have resisted general
pro bono mandates, faculty may well oppose any required reporting, particularly if schools
would publicize results.
79
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Potentially even more promising, law schools could highlight short, discrete
pro bono projects as options for faculty. Many law professors spent little time
in practice and many have gone years or decades without practicing at all.82
Attempting to steer such professors toward pro bono might trigger resistance
in the form of psychological inertia or status quo bias.83 “Compact” pro bono
projects could help combat that inertia. For example, organizations such as
the NAACP or the ACLU sometimes need only discrete research assistance.
Likewise, local public interest organizations often solicit volunteers for
expungement clinics or even simple intake interviews.
To be sure, these simple projects do not sound like the sort of pro bono
work professors would do. But faculty long out of practice may not feel ready
to jump into more involved litigation or transactional matters. Shorter projects
may also help counter the objection that law faculty lack time to devote to pro
bono work.84 Finally, shorter initial projects could help faculty members build
pro bono momentum. Even minimal exposure to poverty-related problems
can help inspire more service.85
B. Reframing the Moral Case
This section advocates a second reframing related to faculty pro bono:
demoting the moral justification. As described above, commentators have
relied on a putative moral duty to justify faculty pro bono.86 This essay does
not dispute the logic undergirding this moral duty.87 Instead, it surfaces the
practical risks of relying on such an argument. Take, for example, “moral
backfire.”88 People strongly resist “the thought of [their] own wrongdoing, and
82
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as Erwin Chemerinsky and Deborah Rhode, discuss lawyers’ pro bono responsibilities but
do not rely heavily on morally charged language to make the point. See Rhode, supra note 12;
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the result is that [they] will bend [their] moral beliefs and even [their]
perceptions to fight off the harsh judgment of [their] own behavior.”89 Indeed,
when confronted with “ethical criticism,” people “engage in motivated
reasoning to protect their worldviews and identities, which can in some cases
result in a bolstering of those attitudes that have been called into question.”90
Law faculty may particularly resist the view that moral principles require
them to do pro bono. Law faculty may already see themselves as good, ethical
public servants, whether performing pro bono work or not.91 Thus, professors
may bridle fiercely at the view that years of law teaching without pro bono has
failed the test of moral duty.92
Moreover, publicly highlighting failure to take moral action by a large
group can inadvertently normalize that failure.93 For example, people in
studies have increased energy usage when they learned that their usage was
below average.94 Thus, featuring mass moral failure or detailing low average
pro bono contributions could boomerang on the goal of increasing pro bono
participation.95

However, these commentators also use language with a strong moral emphasis. For example,
David Luban expressly asserts a “moral obligation” and indicates that law professors’ failure
to do pro bono when they require it of students is a form of “hypocrisy.” Luban, supra note
12, at 66, 75. Similarly, Deborah Rhode states that pro bono is a “condition of professional
privilege.” Rhode, supra note 12, at 162. Moreover, these authors tend to make “duty” the
centerpiece or the leading point in their arguments for faculty pro bono. See Luban, supra
note 12, at 66, 75; Rhode, supra note 12, at 162; Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 1238.
This emphasis on professors’ unsatisfied duties to do pro bono, and the inclusion of
language related to moral obligations, could cause a backfire effect. In a more affirmative
framing, the moral argument would take a back seat rather than a prominent position. See
infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text.
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Even framing praise for faculty pro bono in moral terms could backfire.
When people do something good—such as donating to a charitable cause—
they may feel subsequently licensed to act in a more negative or morally
ambiguous way.96 Thus, casting the discussion of faculty pro bono in primarily
moral terms—whether commending or criticizing—could inadvertently retard
progress.
Rather than framing faculty pro bono primarily in terms of moral
arguments, couching the position more positively could avoid some of these
pitfalls.97 For example, faculty engaging in pro bono can model for students
and thus potentially stoke additional student pro bono.98 In addition, faculty
pro bono can potentially improve professors’ teaching by bringing real-world
lessons and legal issues to the classroom.99 Further, faculty pro bono could
potentially inspire or influence scholarship.100 Scholarship rooted in insights
from recent practice experience could help address the criticism that too much
legal scholarship disregards the realities of the legal profession.101
None of this compels full retirement of the moral obligation argument. In
some instances, ethical reasoning can help spur altruistic conduct.102 Here, the
argument may serve well as a potential response to faculty objections. Placing
the moral point in a responsive role could help avoid alienation effects while
preserving the approach to persuade those open to a morally focused dialogue.
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C. Reframing One-Size-Fits-All Approaches
In addition to morally oriented approaches potentially backfiring, so could
disregarding or disputing professors’ conceptions of their own identities.
Although commentators have argued that faculty are subject to the same
moral obligation as practitioners, faculty do not necessarily view themselves as
practitioners.103 Thus, persuasion aimed at reasons law professors in particular
should do pro bono could meet less resistance.104 This suggests that arguments
about pro bono helping scholarship, modeling, and teaching may work even
better than generally describing the need for more attorney pro bono to fill the
justice gap.
This approach can go further.
The law professoriate is not a monolith. Different segments within legal
academia do not necessarily share interests. This differentiation invites an even
more tailored approach to making the case for faculty pro bono. As described
below, this more bespoke form of persuasion can address faculty segments
at different law schools, rather than merely asserting generalized arguments
about why all faculty should engage in more pro bono.
Differentiation in legal academia implicates research on “communities of
practice” among attorneys.105 According to this literature, “communities of
practice” can have a large impact on attorney identity and behavior.106 Indeed,
communities of practice can particularly influence pro bono participation,
including understandings of why practitioners should do pro bono.107
Different segments of law professors also arguably operate as different
academic communities. For example, legal writing instructors may prioritize
different facets of their work and face different status-related concerns than
doctrinal faculty.108 Faculty committed to community lawyering may cohere
103
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via interests that differ from those of lawyering skills or corporate law faculty.109
More generally, law professors may view their professional identities as tethered
to the particular areas of the law they research and write about.110
Reasoning targeted toward the identities within different communities of
law faculty might help puncture resistance to pro bono. Research suggests
such tailored approaches can work better than generalized strategies.111 For
example, one study found that “specifically targeted initiatives” correlated
with improved practitioner pro bono participation rates, whereas generalized
or “diffusely targeted recruitment efforts” did not.112
Below I provide some examples of targeted reasoning for pro bono. I focus
primarily on lawyering skills teachers but also touch on several other groups
to illustrate contrasting approaches.113
Examples of Tailored Advocacy
Historically, some observers have viewed lawyering skills as a backwater or,
at best, a steppingstone.114
Contrary to that impression, lawyering skills faculty have helped pioneer
key aspects of legal pedagogy.115 For example, they have devised cutting-edge
forms of professionalism instruction and have deployed best practices in
student skills acquisition.116
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The disconnect in perceptions favors lawyering skills teachers’ taking a
frontline role in pro bono practice.
For example, increasing lawyering skills faculty’s participation in pro bono
could help lawyering skills professors burnish their image as legal pedagogy
leaders. Community leadership can require doing hard, important work first.117
Improved pro bono participation can bolster the claim that lawyering skills
instructors represent the leading edge in legal education.
Engaging in pro bono could also help lawyering skills professors model
the unique professionalism expectations they have for their students. Many
lawyering skills faculty teach professionalism and hold their students
accountable for conducting themselves with it.118 Modeling is key to impressing
professional conduct on others: “Actions speak louder than words and examples
work better than exhortation.”119 Pertinent here, “professionalism includes the
aspirational commitment to pro bono.”120 Thus, pro bono for lawyering skills
instructors supports their pedagogical emphasis on professionalism.
The risk of skill decay also favors pro bono work in the lawyering skills
community. As commentators have argued, law teachers should typically
“know their subject extremely well.”121 But extended periods of disuse can lead
to the decay or loss of trained skills.122 Admittedly, law professors can and
do teach skills that they have not exercised in years. But fresh practice with
the way attorneys use skills in the evolving legal market could help ensure
lawyering skills teachers can model and impart the skills their students need.123
Critics, however, could raise status and bandwidth concerns facing lawyering
skills instructors. Some doctrinal faculty or law school administrations view
lawyering skills instructors as lower on the law school hierarchy than doctrinal
faculty.124 Doing pro bono work could fortify the misperception of lawyering
skills faculty as nonscholarly “trade school” instructors. This could impede
interviews with local public interest organizations. Rachel Croskery-Roberts & Ezra Ross,
Creating and Administering a Live Interviewing Project for 1Ls: Benefits, Challenges, and Lessons Learned from
COVID-19, 29 Persps. 9 (2021).
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lawyering skills professors’ efforts to attain equal status in law schools. At
the least, pro bono would deplete time that could go toward work more
appreciated by doctrinal faculty and research universities.
But pro bono work can generate scholarship. In fact, lawyering skills
professors have in the past written scholarly work on their pro bono.125 Further,
pro bono work is not necessarily wedded to low status. To the contrary, highprofile law professors like Dean Erwin Chemerinsky engage in significant
pro bono.126 Moreover, as described above, I advocate providing law faculty
with compact pro bono options to help encourage uptake. Such projects,
undertaken periodically, would not necessarily disrupt lawyering skills
faculty’s commitment to other professional activity.
Tailored reasoning also applies to pro bono by faculty segments besides
lawyering skills. Take business law faculty, whose expertise could play a gapfilling role in pro bono work. Large law firms, which donate a significant share
of pro bono, may not take certain cases against businesses based on positional
conflicts.127 As a result, “lawyers with the greatest expertise in particular areas—
such as employment, consumer credit, or land use law—are the ones least likely
to bring their expertise to bear on pro bono projects.”128 Thus, law faculty with
expertise in business, employment, or consumer credit law could play a special
part by filling key holes in pro bono work done by others.
Further, commentators have called for a broadened scholarly perspective
that explores how business law relates to public interest considerations.129
Performing pro bono work may enrich business law scholars’ conception of
how their areas of study intertwine with ideas of social justice and service
of the public interest. This could lead to more scholarship that makes such
connections.
Ultimately, this essay provides just an initial sketch of a bespoke approach
to arguments for faculty pro bono. But it suggests that such an approach could
apply to a variety of different segments of legal academia.
III. Objections and Responses
By abandoning proposed mandates and downplaying moral reasons for
faculty pro bono, does this proposal deflate its own strongest argument?
125
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Does it fail to seriously tackle law professors’ identification as scholars, not
public interest practitioners? Does it ignore foundational questions about the
definition of pro bono in the context of legal academics?
This part discusses these and other potential objections. They fall loosely
into two categories: arguments that the proposal does too little, and arguments
that the proposal goes too far.
Objections that the Proposed Reframing is Too Limited
Critics could contend that dropping the argument for a faculty pro
bono mandate would undermine progress toward greater faculty pro bono
participation. Many faculty members might do pro bono only if required to
do so. Relinquishing any claim to a mandate could also send the message that
faculty pro bono is unimportant.
But arguments for a faculty mandate have fizzled. Experimenting with a
research-based nudge approach might work better with resistant law faculty
and would not preclude reverting to proposed mandates if it fails. By doing
little to promote faculty pro bono, law schools already signal its lack of
importance. By adopting nudges and supporting conversation about pro
bono benefits, law schools could start to signal the opposite.
Arguably, this proposal also fails adequately to address the biggest obstacle
to faculty pro bono: that many law professors view themselves as academics,
not practitioners. But insisting to law faculty that they misunderstand their
professional identity appears counterproductive. By contrast, the proposal
here aims to meet faculty where they are. Advocating short, discrete pro bono
projects acknowledges that many professors will worry about pro bono work
displacing other professional obligations. And these proposals do attempt to
address professors’ conceptions of professional identity. I advocate training
arguments on law professors’ particularized interests, rather than importing
the same arguments used to urge practitioner pro bono.
Relatedly, detractors could argue that law faculty lack the time for pro bono
practice. Particularly with the ever-expanding email inboxes of the last few
decades, law professors have arguably become inundated with their research,
teaching, and administrative duties. The COVID pandemic exacerbated the
problem, making pro bono practice, along with almost everything else, much
harder than before.
No compelling data, however, substantiate that faculty have become
objectively busier. To the contrary, faculty classroom hours, particularly at
top law schools, have decreased.130 At top twenty-five schools, faculty typically
spend five hours per week or less teaching, zero when on sabbatical.131 Although
130
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faculty might argue they make up for lightened teaching responsibilities with
additional research, the data don’t bear that out either. Reduced teaching
loads show “surprisingly little” association with increased scholarly output.132
To be sure, people do feel busier, potentially in part from the stress of media
multitasking.133 But data don’t necessarily bear out that subjective impression.134
Moreover, Big Law attorneys, who typically work more than legal academics135
and have less flexible schedules, often do regular pro bono work.136 Even busy
professionals can manage some pro bono in their schedules.
In any event, this proposal attempts to accommodate law professors’
schedules—objectively busy or not—in several ways. For example, it advocates
providing faculty with curated lists of pro bono projects to reduce the time
needed to search for suitable assignments. Further, it promotes short, discrete
pro bono projects to cabin the time spent working on each project.
Moreover, although COVID has posed severe challenges for clients,
lawyers, and teachers, some of the workarounds adopted in response to
COVID may help facilitate certain pro bono representations.137 For example,
one law school found that Zoom intake interviews could help improve access
for more members of the community and made attending and conducting
interviews more practicable for interviewers.138
Another objection is that deemphasizing the moral duty argument for
faculty pro bono would relinquish much of the position’s persuasive force.
And as an empirical matter, some evidence does indicate that people volunteer
more when they focus on their ethical obligations.139 But the moral duty
argument has problems on the merits. Donating money, for example, might
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under some circumstances do more good than pro bono work.140 Further,
as described above, even if the moral argument possesses logical power, it
may as a practical matter backfire with faculty members. Given the apparent
lack of faculty pro bono progress, good justification exists for at least trying
approaches not rooted in moral duty.
Another arguably missing piece in this project: incentives. Schools
potentially need to provide incentives for pro bono work by rewarding faculty
who do it and considering pro bono work in tenure and promotion decisions.
Doing so could radically change the conversation; not doing so could paralyze
it. Either way, this pivotal issue should arguably figure more prominently in
this analysis of faculty pro bono.
Rewards and promotional consideration could certainly play a role in
encouraging faculty pro bono. But some law schools already do these things.141
It is unclear they have any impact. This may be because law schools often say
only that pro bono may receive consideration at promotion.142 Faculty might
reasonably assume, based on such lukewarm representations, that pro bono
cannot substitute for scholarly accomplishment or teaching evaluations. Thus,
these policies might not motivate faculty members to alter their current mix of
scholarship, teaching, and service. Nor would law schools likely change such
policies in a way that would significantly modify incentives, e.g., by allowing
pro bono to offset scholarly output for tenure-track faculty. In any event, this
essay showcases research-based nudges, rather than incentives that some law
schools already employ, to try to bring fresh perspectives to the conversation
about pro bono.
Concerns about faculty qualifications also form a cluster of objections.
Arguably, law professors without significant practice experience cannot
competently represent clients. Some law professors lack even bar admission
or a law degree. The proposal here to increase faculty pro bono arguably
disregards these important limitations.
Like other commentators, however, “I find it hard to believe . . . that a
person teaching law cannot find some area of the law in which he or she is
competent.”143 In any event, professors’ inexperience does not justify avoiding
pro bono. To the contrary, it warrants pro bono participation just to acquire
that experience, for the sake of improving both teaching and scholarship.144
Unlicensed professors pose a different issue, but not an insurmountable one.
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Although faculty without licenses cannot alone handle legal matters, they can
contribute to pro bono matters under the supervision of a licensed attorney.145
Unlicensed students may do this when they do pro bono. No reason prevents
law professors from doing likewise.
Critics could also assert that this essay ignores a foundational question—
how to define pro bono in the first instance. What counts and what doesn’t
for faculty? Does membership on boards of public interest organizations?
What about political advocacy for marginalized groups? Or testimony before
Congress?
These are important questions—but ones, I argue, that do not need
definitive answers to advocate increased faculty pro bono. Wading into
long-stalemated debates146 could hamstring discussion of faculty pro bono.
For now, this proposal seeks merely to try to jump-start the conversation. It
therefore reasonably tables the issue of what—beyond unpaid legal work for
the indigent—could qualify as pro bono.
Objections that the Proposal Goes Too Far
Critics could also object that the proposal misconstrues when choice
architects can effectively use nudges. Experts on nudges have stated that
nudges should be used “to influence choices in a way that will make choosers
better off, as judged by themselves.”147 But the proposal here would use nudges to
push law professors to do work not to make them better off, but to make others
better off. Moreover, many law professors simply do not want to do pro bono
because they view themselves as academics, not practitioners. They don’t lack
information and their preferences are clear. No justification for a paternalistic
intervention exists.
This objection interprets nudges too narrowly. Authorities on nudges have
endorsed nudges to promote charitable giving.148 The justification: “[M]ost
people have charitable impulses, and we suspected that because of inertia they
give far less than they actually want to give.”149 As discussed above, inertia
likely plays a role here too.150 Moreover, some law schools have adopted written
145
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policies at least generally encouraging faculty pro bono.151 Thus, nudging law
faculty toward pro bono could help make law professors better off according
to the values expressed by their own law schools.
Critics could also challenge the proposal to tailor advocacy for faculty pro
bono to particular communities within legal academia. Arguably, the proposal
overstates differences in faculty segments and could play into outmoded
ideas about divisions among doctrinal, clinical, and lawyering skills faculty.152
Alternatively, assuming important differences do exist in how faculty view
pro bono, those differences may be far too individualized for this proposal to
realistically address them.
However, despite aspirations to faculty arrangements in which doctrinal,
clinical, and lawyering skills instructors all share the same footing, that is
not the case at many law schools.153 Status issues often separate the treatment
of these groups, and research and pedagogical interests diverge as well.154
Acknowledging that reality strengthens, rather than weakens, the proposal.
And although no arguments or approaches tailored to groups will precisely
target individual professors’ interests or concerns, that is no reason to deploy
only generalized advocacy for faculty pro bono. Some tailoring of arguments
for faculty pro bono could work better than none, even if imperfect.
Opponents may also object that law faculty should not need to do pro
bono because law teaching and scholarship already constitute public service
work. Other commentators have dispatched this misconception.155 Teaching
and scholarship do not ameliorate the problem of unmet legal services need.156
And giving up higher pay in private practice does not equal pro bono work
for those in need.157 It merely represents a trade-off of salary for freedom from
billable hours, freedom to choose what to research, and freedom from the
burden of stressed-out clients and abrasive opponents.158
Another objection asserts that proposals to increase faculty pro bono are
premature because adequate data about faculty pro bono contributions does
not exist. But no one seriously suggests that law faculty as a group consistently
do significant pro bono work. To the contrary, commentators have said the
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situation appears shameful.159 Schools may decline to record faculty pro bono
hours just to avoid disclosure of embarrassingly low figures. In any event,
encouraging more faculty pro bono does not exclude also trying to pinpoint
where the figures precisely stand. Research and surveys related to that question
deserve attention. But requiring precision before taking action in this context
would hobble reform efforts.
Finally, critics could argue that I have overstated the contribution this
proposal makes to the literature. For example, others have written on faculty
pro bono and, in any event, much of the analysis in the substantial scholarship
on practitioner pro bono applies to the subcase of faculty pro bono. Thus, this
essay arguably exaggerates the gap it purports to fill.
But few authors have accepted the invitations from fifteen to twenty years
ago to take part in a robust conversation about faculty pro bono.160 And
scholarship on pro bono generally, or practitioner pro bono in particular,
doesn’t automatically apply here. As this essay argues, transplanting arguments
from other contexts that don’t address the unique self-conception of legal
academics may undermine progress.
IV. Conclusion
Both at law schools and in scholarship, conversations about law faculty pro
bono have largely wilted from view. The problem is easy to name, but hard
to solve.
Mandates may sound promising. But realistically faculty won’t regulate
themselves that way. Ethics-based persuasion appears on point. But it risks
alienating the audience and further entrenching the behaviors at issue.
Arguing that faculty pro bono duties should track those of practitioners seems
uncontroversial. But doing so may disregard faculty’s strongly held beliefs
about their academic identity.
Reframing some of the terms of the conversation represents an initial step.
It doesn’t solve persistent problems, like what counts as pro bono in the first
instance. And how well it might work hinges on speculation. Some of the
approaches in this essay are backed by behavioral research. And implementing
them would not impose prohibitive costs, on law school administrations or
faculty. But maybe softening the messaging to faculty would backfire. Or
cause little impact at all.
Ultimately, a revised frame is only as good as what happens within the
window it attempts to open. This project does not purport to provide a
complete solution. Instead, it invites a new chapter: experimentation in how
law schools think about and encourage faculty pro bono.

159

See Rhode, Legal Ethics, supra note 10, at 54.

160
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